




# PARSEC

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
Password Authentication  
using Response Signed  
with Elliptic Curve

Nikita Maliavin


# DIY: authentication plugin



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



 The password table can be stolen  
 Store:  
salt+hash(passwd+salt)


← scramble  
→ nonce+hash(passwd+nonce+scramble)




# DIY: authentication plugin



 The password table can be stolen


 Store:  
**salt+hash(passwd+salt)**


$H = \text{hash}(\text{passwd} + \text{salt})$   
→ nonce+hash(H+nonce+scramble)




# DIY: authentication plugin



 The password table can be stolen

 Store:  
**salt**+hash(passwd+salt)  
Regenerate **salt** if stolen



$H = \text{hash}(\text{passwd} + \text{salt})$   
→ nonce+hash(H+nonce+scramble)



# Asymmetric signatures

- We want to sign the message  $m$  and check the result.
- We'll generate the key pair:  $K_{\text{priv}}, K_{\text{pub}}$

$\text{sgn} = \text{Sign}(m, K_{\text{priv}})$

$\text{signed?} = \text{Check}(m, K_{\text{pub}})$

- Can we build such pair of functions, Sign and Check?



# Asymmetric signatures at home

- Let **E** and **D** be the asymmetric encryption and decryption functions

$\text{Sign}(m, K_{\text{priv}}) := m + \mathbf{E}(\text{sha512}(m), K_{\text{priv}})$


$\text{Check}(s, K_{\text{pub}}) := \text{begin}$



$m := s[: -64]$

$h := s[-64:]$

**return**  $:= \text{sha512}(m) == \mathbf{D}(h, K_{\text{pub}})$   
**end**

# DIY: authentication plugin



 The password table can be stolen  
  $K_{priv} = \text{passwd}$   
Store:  $K_{pub} = F(\text{passwd})$

← scramble



$s = \text{Sign}(\text{scramble}, K_{priv})$   
→ s

← Check(s,  $K_{pub}$ ) ? OK : FAIL



# DIY: authentication plugin






 The password table can be stolen  
  $K_{priv} = \text{passwd}$   
Store:  $K_{pub} = F(\text{passwd})$

← scramble

→ Sign(scramble,  $K_{priv}$ )


← Check(s,  $K_{pub}$ ) ? OK : FAIL

ed25519:

-  customized ed25519
-  no salt
-  no nonce




# DIY: authentication plugin





👹 Precalculates Sign(0, \*) for every \*




# DIY: authentication plugin



 The password table can be stolen

  $K_{priv} = \text{passwd}$   
Store:  $K_{pub} = F(\text{passwd})$

 Precalculates  $\text{Sign}(0, *)$  for every \*

 PARSEC 

# PARSEC:

✓ Uses OpenSSL, GnuTLS/nettle for ed25519, randoms, hashes

✓ Uses PBKDF2/SHA512 for salt with > 1k iterations

😓 can't use bcrypt/ncrypt from windows

Conforms NIST recommendations:

- 32-byte scramble
- 32-byte nonce
- 18-byte salt
- 64-byte sig, key is 32-byte


# PARSEC:

ext-salt = (hash-alg, iterations, salt)

hash-alg = PBKDF2

Challenge\_resp = nonce +  
ed25519\_sign(nonce+scramble,  $K_{priv}$ )

$K_{priv}$  = PBKDF2(passwd)




# PARSEC/Soon:

- Configurable as default (-1 roundtrip)
- Cache ext-salt or save in ini (-1 roundtrip)

Some day:

- Migration from native/old plugins
- HKDF (why not?)





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